Tester raises fresh concerns about moving ag disease research lab to ‘tornado alley’

Senator pushes Homeland Security Department to re-open site selection process for hazardous research facility

(U.S. SENATE) – Senator Jon Tester has raised renewed concerns about plans to relocate an agricultural disease research lab to the heart of beef country, and is pushing the U.S. Homeland Security Department to re-open its selection process for a new site.

The Homeland Security Department is currently relocating the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility from an isolated island off the coast of New York to Kansas.  The site of the new facility is within 200 miles of ten percent of all cattle in the nation, and in an area prone to dangerous tornadoes.

Concerned by the move, Tester added language to 2009 legislation that barred federal funding for the facility until the National Academy of Sciences conducted an independent review of the Department of Homeland Security’s safety analysis and emergency response plan in case of an accidental release of a contagious livestock disease, such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease.

The report, released in November, estimated the probability of a disease outbreak from the facility at nearly 70 percent over the next 50 years.  The report also found that the Department’s safety plan “is not entirely adequate or valid.”  Although the Department pledged to revise some of its construction plans to improve safety, it has not provided details or a revised cost estimate.

In a letter this week to Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, Tester again warned that damage to such a facility could “disperse viruses classified as biological weapons far and wide, and would make response and containment of a release nearly impossible.”

“A release of Foot and Mouth Disease could decimate the domestic livestock industry, do irreparable harm to the economy of my state and of the nation, and would jeopardize one critical component of this nation’s food security,” Tester wrote.  “DHS should consider re-opening the site selection process for NBAF, with a greater consideration given to the risk of locating the facility where accidental release would have immediate and catastrophic impact on the livestock industry, and where well-known tornado risk threatens the security of stored pathogens.”

“Research on such pathogens in the past has been carried out at a facility on Plum Island off the coast of New York, well away from important and vulnerable livestock industry resources. I feel this was an appropriate precaution given the serious threats these pathogens pose to our economy,” Tester added.

The report by the National Academies of Science is available online, HERE.

Tester’s letter to Napolitano appears below.

The Honorable Janet Napolitano
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
310 7th Street NW
Washington, DC 20528

Secretary Napolitano:

I am writing to you with renewed concerns about the relocation of the Department of Homeland Security’s most hazardous animal pathogen research from Plum Island, NY, to a new National Bio-Agro Research Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas. This decision would bring extremely dangerous animal pathogens, including Foot and Mouth Disease, to the heart of beef country. An accidental release of the virulently contagious Foot and Mouth Disease from a facility near a busy animal hospital would put the $73 billion beef industry at serious risk.

The proposed facility would be located in an area prone to severe tornadoes.  A tornado that damages NBAF could disperse viruses classified as biological weapons far and wide, and would make response and containment of a release nearly impossible. A release of Foot and Mouth Disease could decimate the domestic livestock industry, do irreparable harm to the economy of my state and of the nation, and would jeopardize one critical component of this nation’s food security. It could also isolate the domestic livestock industry by prompting other nations to cease meat imports. It would almost certainly lead to massive livestock deaths throughout the country.

As you know, funding for NBAF construction was provided in the Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill, but its release was conditioned on a site-specific risk assessment conducted by DHS, and a review of that assessment by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). That review was completed in November of 2010. NAS discovered a number of deficiencies in DHS’s risk assessment that caused DHS to underestimate the risk of locating NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. In particular, the NAS review estimated the likelihood of a Foot and Mouth Disease release in the next 50 years at nearly 70%, with an economic impact of $9 billion to $50 billion . These impacts would be felt especially hard in rural America.

In March, the President signed a continuing resolution placing additional restrictions on funding for construction of NBAF. Under the continuing resolution, funding for construction must be withheld until DHS submits:
“…a revised site-specific biosafety and biosecurity mitigation risk assessment that describes how to significantly reduce risks of conducting essential research and diagnostic testing at the National Bio- and Agro-defense Facility and addresses shortcomings identified in the National Academy of Sciences’ evaluation of the initial site-specific biosafety and biosecurity mitigation risk assessment.” (PL 112-10 Sec. 1647(b))

Many of the risks identified in NAS’s review are due to the proximity of the Kansas site to other important livestock transportation, research, and medical facilities nearby. In short, the NAS review of DHS’s risk assessment constitutes a significant change in the criteria for a successful and safe animal disease research facility. Any additional risk mitigation added to the proposed NBAF will increase the cost of building and operating the facility. In light of these increased costs, DHS should not devote funds to construction of NBAF until full cost reconsideration is completed and reported to Congress.

Further, any such additional costs should not be borne by the federal government, especially at a time when DHS is facing cuts to first responder and other security programs.

DHS should consider re-opening the site selection process for NBAF, with a greater consideration given to the risk of locating the facility where accidental release would have immediate and catastrophic impact on the livestock industry, and where well-known tornado risk threatens the security of stored pathogens. Research on such pathogens in the past has been carried out at a facility on Plum Island off the coast of New York, well away from important and vulnerable livestock industry resources. I feel this was an appropriate precaution given the serious threats these pathogens pose to our economy.

I look forward to working with you on this issue.

Sincerely,
(s)
Jon Tester
United States Senator